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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WALTER W. SPRAGUE and UNITED 
STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Respondents, 
v. 
BOYLES BROS. DRILLING COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
8351 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The disagreement between the respective parties' state-
ment of facts is negligible, and the additional facts stated 
by respondents are without legal consequence. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
Respondents agree that Sprague did not remove any 
rock from the quarry until May 7, although all of the rock 
exposed in the quarry by the explosion of February 3, was 
reduced to contract size by appellant as early as February 
23. They do not question appellant's authorities which 
demonstrate that this admitted breach of Sprague's coven-
ants precludes respondents from recovering any damages 
on account of the delay in the performance of his prime 
contract. 
Respondents attach no legal significance whatever to 
their failure to furnish appellant compressed air after the 
Bergraph 315 compressor broke down and was removed 
from the quarry on September 21. This breach goes to the 
very heart of the subcontract, because it stopped completely 
all of defendant's operations in the quarry. We are aware 
that the small LeRoi compressor was available, but it was 
virtually useless to the defendant at that time (R. 370). 
It could be used only to operate one small drill for secon-
dary breaking (R. 370). As it was necessary to do primary 
rock breaking at that time, the failure to furnish a com-
pressor of the capacity of the Bergraph 315 put an end to 
the production of rock in the quarry (R. 367-8). 
Although respondents' counsel ignore this glaring de-
fault, their superintendent was fully aware of its signifi-
cance. We again refer to his testimony at pages 411, 412 
and 414 of the record where he indicates the critical situa-
tion caused by the breakdown of the 315 compressor and 
describes his persistent and far-flung efforts to replace it. 
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Appellant's contention that Sprague's failure to remove 
the contract size rock from the quarry with any degree 
of promptness and to furnish compressed air following the 
breakdown of the Bergraph compressor precludes any re-
covery by respondents and gives rise to a cause of action 
in favor of appellant remains unchallenged, except for the 
bald assertion that appellant did not break the rock in the 
manner or within the time provided for in the contract. 
Respondents appear to be under the impression that appel-
lant was to break the full amount of rock required by the 
contract into the size therein specified by either a single 
explosion or by carving chunks of contract size rock out of 
the wall of the quarry. That the parties did not contemplate 
any such operation is demonstrated by the fact that they 
expressly provided in the contract for secondary breaking 
of rock. 
We cannot determine from respondents' brief whether 
they contend that the contract required appellant to deliver 
the contract size rocks into trucks at the mouth of the 
quarry, or to furnish respondents a traxcavator, a dragline, 
a tractor, and a shovel for that purpose. Perhaps both con-
tentions are made. Neither of them can be maintained. The 
full extent of work required of appellant by the contract 
was to break into specified sizes in the quarry the native 
rock constituting the walls of the quarry. It did not agree 
to furnish any equipment or machinery of any kind or 
character. It did not agree to do any sorting, loading, mov-
ing, hauling or delivering. 
Since it is conceded by respondents that no contract 
size rock was removed from the quarry until the middle 
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of May, it is immaterial whether they are correct in stating 
that all acceptable rock was removed from the quarry in 
that month. However, such is not the fact. According to 
the records maintained by the Government and by Mrs. 
Sprague and the testimony of respondents' superintendent 
(R. 117), a large amount of contract size rock broken in 
February was not removed from the quarry until the last 
two or three days of July and the first two or three days 
of August. 
It is true that respondents did some secondary breaking 
of rock in the latter part of July and the early part of 
August. They are in error in charging the cost of this 
work against appellant. The work was done after appel-
lant abandoned the contract in the latter part of April or 
first of May. Being legally justified in stopping perform-
ance, appellant was under no obligation to resume perform-
ance. It resumed the production of rock only after receiv-
ing the payment due April 20, and being assured by United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company that it would assume 
the obligations of Sprague under the contract. Whatever 
work respondents did in the way of breaking rock in the 
quarry after appellant left the quarry in the latter part of 
April and before it resumed breaking the rock in August 
is not chargeable against appellant. 
An additional fact justifying the appellant in quitting 
the quarry in the latter part of April was the failure of 
Sprague to make the payment due on the 20th of that 
month. On page 17 of their brief, respondents admit that 
the amount due appellant on April 20, was $4392.00. 
Sprague's surety finally paid the installment on July 26, 
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using the payment as a means of inducing appellant to 
resume the breaking of rock. 
Respondents attempt to minimize their breach of the 
covenant to furnish sufficient compressed air to operate 
defendant's drills efficiently by pointing out that appel-
lant did not request Sprague to furnish a man to start the 
compressor and that Sprague did not refuse to take steps to 
have the compressor repaired when needed. While the 
contract, in our opinion, clearly required Sprague to supply 
an operator to start the compressors and keep them running, 
appellant does not claim any damages or that it was justi-
fied in stopping work in the quarry on either the last of 
April or the 5th of October, because of the failure to fur-
nish such operator. Neither does the appellant contend 
that Sprague ever refused to repair any compressor. It is 
clear, however, from the testimony of his partner wife 
that he did not consider that he was under any duty to 
furnish appellant with compressed air except for a brief 
period at the outset of the operations (See R. 147-8). 
Respondents admit "there was some difficulty about 
compressed air." vVe construe this admission to mean that 
while there was a breach of the covenant to furnish com-
pressed air, the breach was not so material as to justify 
the appellant in failing to break the full amount of rock 
specified by the contract, but can be adequately compensated 
by an award of damages. We agree that for the breach of 
the covenant to furnish compressed air up to the latter part 
of April, an award of damages would be an adequate rem-
edy. \Ve cannot agree, however, that respondents' failure 
to furnish appellant sufficient compressed air to operate 
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its drills efficiently after the Bergraph compressor broke 
down on September 21, was not a sufficiently material 
breach to justify the appellant abandoning the contract 
on October 5, or that an award of damages would alone be 
an adequate remedy. 
When the Bergraph compressor broke down on Sep-
tember 21, appellant's operations had reached the point 
where it was necessary to do additional primary breaking 
of rock. The small LeRoi compressor was useless for the 
purpose of drilling the holes required to do the primary 
breaking. As a matter of fact, it would operate only one 
small jack hammer and that inefficiently. Without a com-
pressor of the capacity of the Bergraph 315, all rock break-
ing operations in the quarry were at a complete standstill. 
It was impossible to break the rock without drills, and it 
was impossible to operate the drills without an air com-
pressor. Appellant's men ~nd equipment stood by idle in 
the quarry for more than two weeks while respondents' 
superintendent spent "hours and hours and hours" on the 
telephone contacting "every equipment house and con-
tractor, or anybody who I thought might have a compressor 
or know of a compressor throughout the state and two sur-
rounding states." Under these circumstances, the question 
whether respondents' breach of the covenant to furnish 
compressed air after September 21, was substantial enough 
to justify defendant in abandoning the work is not open 
to debate. 
Respondents' citation from Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts sets forth certain considerations for determining 
whether a failure to perform a contract is so material as to 
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relieve the other party from performance of a correspond-
ing promise. Applying those considerations to the case at 
bar requires a holding that appellant was relieved of the 
duty of breaking the specified amount of rock by the failure 
of respondents to furnish it with compressed air as provided 
in the contract. 
POINT II. 
Respondents make no complaint whatever of the ruling 
of the trial court sustaining appellant's objection to their 
offer of proof of what respondents refer to as the proper 
method of producing rock in this quarry. 
The ruling is not complained of, because it was ob-
viously correct. In neither the complaint, the amended 
complaint in Case No. 96365, nor in the complaint in the 
present case did plaintiffs even suggest or intimate that 
appellant broke the rock in an unworkmanlike manner. 
There was no pretrial order enlarging the issues raised by 
the pleadings. The trial court correctly rejected the appel-
lant's offer of proof, because there was no issue raised by 
the pleadings to which it was material. 
Furthermore, what respondents offered to prove were 
certain theories that by drilling holes on the top of the 
wall of the quarry the rock could be broken to contract size 
without secondary breaking. This theory was exploded by 
respondents themselves. After appellant left the quarry, 
they drilled holes on the top of the quarry by a wagon drill 
(an oversized jack hammer R. 133). That the rock broken 
in this manner had to be rebroken by secondary blasting 
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is demonstrated by the testimony of their superintendent 
at R. 128-129. 
Notwithstanding the assertion of respondents' counsel 
to the contrary, ·appellant did some primary breaking by 
drilling the holes from the top of the quarry wall. See R. 
367-8. 
It must be remembered that the initial explosion broke 
several thousand tons of rock from the quarry wall, and 
that at the time respondents and appellant did primary 
breaking by drilling holes on top of the quarry wall, only 
a small amount of rock remained to be broken. It requires 
no expert testimony to demonstrate that this method of 
primary breaking was slow and tedious compared to the 
coyote hole method. We repeat, however, that each method 
required secondary breaking. 
Respondents' counsel states that the record is full of 
testimony to show that appellant did not break the rock in 
a workmanlike manner, but he fails to point out any what-
soever. We submit that there is none. 
POINT III. 
Respondents in effect request this court to vacate so 
much of the memorandum decision of the trial court as 
determined that the cost to Sprague of breaking the addi-
tional rock required to complete the prime contract after 
appellant left the quarry was less than the contract required 
to be paid appellant. If this could be done, it would simply 
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leave the record destitute of a finding essential to support 
an award of damages to respondents. 
Our contention that the evidence is insufficient to show 
that it cost respondents more than the contract price to 
produce the additional rock after appellant terminated its 
operations, because there is no segregation of the cost of 
compressed air is entirely ignored in respondents' brief. 
Accordingly, our position in this regard should be taken 
as confessed. 
Neither do respondents attempt to sustain the ruling 
of the trial court admitting in evidence the packages and 
bundles marked Exhibits 16-P, 16P-a, 23-P and 23-Pa, other 
than to say that they "believe that these exhibits and others 
of similar character were * * * properly received in 
evidence." No reasons are given for respondents' belief. 
No authorities are cited and no exception is taken to appel-
lant's authorities which hold that its objections to those 
exhibits were well taken. 
POINT IV. 
To support the award of $823.15 for so-called increased 
cost of loading and hauling rock, respondents rely upon 
their Exhibit 31-P. This Exhibit was composed by Mrs. 
Sprague, a partner with her husband in the project. The 
Exhibit is a completely self-serving document and is with-
out any authenticity or foundation whatsoever. The state-
ment of Mrs. Sprague that it was based upon files and rec-
ords in her possession can give the instrument no weight 
whatever. A person cannot lift himself by his own boot-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
straps. The instrument has no more probative value than 
the statement of respondents' counsel in his brief. 
Apart from the absence of any evidence to support 
the item of damage under consideration, there is no basis 
in the contract for imposing upon the appellant any cost 
of loading or hauling the rock whether such costs were 
increased or decreased. If, as has been demonstrated there 
is no evidence that appellant broke the rock in an unwork-
manlike manner, it follows that it discharged its entire duty 
under the contract by breaking the rock to contract size in 
the quarry. The matter of loading and hauling the rock was 
the sole concern of the respondents. 
POINT V. 
Respondents admit that Sprague defaulted in the pay-
ment due under the terms of the contract on April 20, and 
that under the decisions of this court cited in our main 
brief appellant was justified in abandoning the contract. 
Since it did abandon the contract on May 1, it follows from 
respondents' admissions that appellant is not liable for delay 
on the part of Sprague in the performance of his prime 
contract. It is, therefore, unnecessary to again refer to 
evidence of Sprague's financial collapse, weather conditions, 
restrictions upon the use of highways for hauling rock and 
the changes in the plans of the levee whereby the revetment 
was extended an additional 300 feet (see Exhibit 4-P), all 
of which contributed heavily to Sprague's failure to com-
plete the prime project on time. 
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It is immaterial whether appellant abandoned the work 
on May 1 because of Sprague's failure to make the April 
20 payment or because of some other breach of the contract 
by him. 
Admittedly appellant resumed the work of breaking 
the rock after receiving from the Surety Company the 
payment of July 26. It did so solely upon the assurance of 
the Surety Company that it would comply with all of 
Sprague's covenants in the contract. Appellant continued 
its operations thereafter until respondents failed to supply 
it with compressed air after the Bergraph compressor broke 
down on September 21. 
POINT VI. 
In our opening brief we cited evidence which estab-
lished that after appellant abandoned the contract about 
the first of May, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company induced appellant to resume the work of produc-
ing rock in the quarry, and assumed the obligations of 
Sprague under the contract, thereby becoming liable pri-
marily for failure to furnish to appellant compressed air 
to operate its drills. Respondents in answer to this con-
tention merely assert that the evidence cited does not have 
the effect which appellant attached to it. No authorities 
are cited by respondents and no exception is taken to those 
cited by appellant. We submit that our construction of the 
evidence is correct. 
We also pointed to the allegations of plaintiffs' com-
plaint in case No. 96365 wherein the United States Fidelity 
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& Guaranty Company affirmatively alleged that it became 
obligated to perform the contract between Sprague and 
Boyles Bros. Drilling Company, and that it did perform 
the contract. Respondents counsel pleads a most pathetic 
confession of embarrassment for having made these allega-
tions. 
Why these allegations should cause counsel any distress 
is extremely difficult to comprehend. The allegation that 
the Surety Company became obligated to perform the con-
tract is strictly in accord with the facts as disclosed by the 
evidence cited in our opening brief. Of course, the allega-
tion that it performed the contract is contrary to the undis-
puted evidence, but that is in the last analysis a conclusion 
of law. Plaintiffs' pleadings are full of similar erroneous 
conclusions, and, of course, the same could be said of their 
brief. 
The allegation that United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company issued its bond for the performance of the con-
tract between Boyles and Sprague, although not strictly 
accurate, is not so out of line with the facts as to call for 
any apology. It did issue its bond, and that bond was for 
the benefit of Boyles Bros., as a supplier of labor which 
went into the project covered by the prime contract. 
The statement in respondents' brief that the trial court 
found that there was no failure to furnish compressed air 
is contrary to the record. The trial court made no finding 
whatever upon that issue as we have shown under Point 
VIII of our brief. 
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POINT VII. 
Inasmuch as respondents in effect confess error with 
respect to the award of $292.80 for rock purchased by them, 
there is no occasion to do more than agree with counsel that 
this error alone would not require a reversal of the j udg-
ment or the granting of a new trial. But the record in this 
case contains numerous other errors which cannot be cor-
rected by a simple order reducing the judgment. 
POINT VIII. 
To the respondents' inquiry as to what would have been 
added by the finding "plaintiff furnished defendant with 
compressed air to operate its drills efficiently," the answer 
is that there would have been a determination of at least 
one of the material issues raised by the pleadings. Of 
course, the finding would have been contrary to the undis-
puted evidence, but it would indicate that the trial court 
understood what at least one of the issues were. 
Respondents say that when it comes to the breaches 
of the contract on the part of the defendant, the findings 
are specific and exact. They contend that the memorandum 
decision must be regarded as part of the findings of fact. 
But if this be allowed, there still is a complete failure to 
find upon the material issues raised by the pleadings. In 
this connection, it will be remembered that the respondents 
repudiated the memorandum decision wherein it was de-
termined that the cost to respondents of producing the rock 
after appellant left the quarry on October 5, was less than 
the cost under the contract sued upon. 
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We agree that the memorandum decision discloses that 
the trial court did determine that while there was a breach 
of Sprague's covenant to furnish appellant with enough 
compressed air to operate its drills efficiently, the breach 
was not sufficient to authorize a rescission or cancellation 
of the contract. We emphasize again that appellant does 
not claim any right to rescind or cancel the contract. It is, 
therefore, unnecessry to consider whether the breach of 
Sprague's covenants would or would not justify the remedy 
of rescission or cancellation. 
POINT IX. 
The proposition discussed in Point IX of our opening 
brief was predicated upon an assumption contrary to the 
record that there was some conflict in the evidence with 
respect to the issues raised by the pleadings. Since respon-
dents do not seriously contend that any such conflict exists, 
the matter discussed in our Point IX has become moot. 
POINT X. 
Respondents make a very plausible argument to the 
effect that they should have been permitted to file their 
amended complaint in Case No. 96365. The difficulty con-
fronting respondents is that the argument is untimely. They 
have not appealed from the order denying them the right 
to file the amended complaint. That order still stands in 
full force and effect. It surely must be accorded some legal 
force or effect. 
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It is amusing of respondents to complain of being 
deprived of their day in court. They were in court on their 
original complaint, and nothing has occurred to prevent 
them from being fully heard in that action. The ruling of 
the court refusing to allow them to file the amended com-
plaint did not prevent them from going forward. If the 
ruling were erroneous, it could have been corrected by 
appeal. 
Respondents have been accorded not only their day in 
court, but actually have been using two days. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents have not only failed to answer appellant's 
objections to the judgment appealed from, but have not 
even grappled with the problems. They have ignored the 
principles of law inyolved. They agree with the facts as 
outlined in appellant's brief and do not point out any addi-
tional facts of any legal significance. They admit that the 
covenant of Sprague to furnish appellant with sufficient 
compressed air to operate its drills efficiently was broken, 
that Sprague failed to remove the rock from the quarry 
as required by the contract, and that the payment due 
appellant was not made until three months late. 
A number of errors set out in our brief are either 
expressly or impliedly confessed. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be 
reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of 
appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., 
for 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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